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RETHINKING MEDIA LIABILITY FOR
DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC FIGURES
John L. Diamondt
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, television, radio, and the print media have tilted to-

ward exploitative sensationalism in the quest for higher ratings or circulation. The 1990's version of truth or consequences confronts studio
guests with unknown same-sex admirers;' network anchors inquire from
elderly mothers of public figures the details of privately uttered remarks
after promising confidentiality; 2 syndicated current affairs programs
highlight lurid details of public figures. Should the law respond differ-

ently than it currently does? This essay argues a cautious yes. It also
proposes a reform and contrasts it with alternative proposals, including
the Annenberg Reform Proposal, 3 proposals by Professor Marc Franklin 4
and Professor David A. Barrett,5 and the Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamations Act.6

A.

THE BREAK WITH THE PAST -

NEW YORK TIMES CO. v.

SULLIVAN

7
Media regulation has evolved dramatically in the last thirty years.
Prior to 1964, common law torts codified in state legislation imposed

f Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A., Yale
College; Dipl. Crim., Cambridge University; J.D., Columbia Law School. The author would
like to express his gratitude for the outstanding research assistance of Anthony P. Canini,
David B. Gorodess and Martin L. Pitha.
1 See Bill Carter, The Media Business, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at D7.
2 See Karen DeWitt, The 104th Congress: The Speaker's Mother, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5,
1995, at A23.
3 See Rodney A. Smolla & Michael J. Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal:
The Casefor Enactment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 25 (1990).
See also Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault. Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its
ProperPlace, 101 HARv. L. Rsv. 1287 (1988).
4 See Marc A. Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a
Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Good Names and Bad Law]; Marc A.
Franklin, A DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L. REv. 809
(1986) [hereinafter DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative].
5 David A. Barrett, DeclaratoryJudgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 847 (1986).
6 UNIFORM CORRECTION OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION Acr (1993).

7 This evolution has consisted in a shift in standards towards the imposition of less
liability, from common law strict liability to a less rigorous subjective 'actual malice' standard.
See Paul C. Weiler, Defamation,EnterpriseLiability, and Freedom ofSpeech, 17 U. TORONTO

289

290

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PuBLIc

POLICY

[Vol. 5:289

substantial media accountability through defamation, privacy, and, potentially, intentional infliction of emotional distress. 8 Defamation imposes liability for publication of factual assertions that are false and
seriously damage the victim's reputation. 9 Traditionally, truth is a defense under the common law, but failure to establish truth would result in
liability for both general, special and, potentially, punitive damages.10
The common law requires that the "publication" or communication to a
third party be intentional or negligent, but does not require that the falsity
of the defamation be the result of intent, recklessness, or negligence."I
As a result, defamation exists under the common law as a strict liability
tort.'

2

Common law privileges provided some immunity for special communications' 3 but did not generally protect the media.' 4 If the media
L.J. 278 (1967); Harvey Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the FirstAmendment: Hill,
Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. Rnv. 267.
8 See Jeremiah Smith, Jones v. Hulton: Three Conflicting Views as to a Question of
Defamation, 60 U. PA. L. REv. 365, 461 (1912); W. S. Holdsworth, A Chapterof Accidents in
the Law of Libel, 57 L.Q. REv. 74 (1941).
9 See RESTATEMENT (TRmD) OF TORTS § 559 (stating "[a] communication is defamatory
if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.") See also Donald Gillmer
& Jerome Barron, Mass. Communication Law 197-201 (4th Ed. 1984).
10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (stating "[olne who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true.")
11 See E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20, stating, "[a] person charged with libel
cannot defend himself by shewing [sic] that he intended in his own breast not to defame, or
that he intended not to defame the plaintiff, if in fact he did both."
12 Stanley Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 U. VA. L.
REv. 785, 797 (1979) ("Three characteristics marked common law defamation: strict liability,
presumption of damages, and limited availability of defenses.").
13 Privileged communications include the reports issued by credit agencies to their clients and the discussions between individuals who are engaged in a group or common enterprise, most notably employers and their employees. See Jeremiah Smith, Conditional
Privilege for Mercantile Agencies, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 187 (1914). See also RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-587 (Judges and parties to suits also enjoy an absolute privilege).
The existence of a privilege is determined by the interests of the speaker, the interests of
the audience, or a common interest between the two. See Toogood v. Spyring, 149 Eng. Rep.
1044 (Ex. 1834). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594-596.
The most difficult of situations arises when a defendant volunteers information when no
inquiry has been made of him. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
1151-1153 (6th ed. 1995).
14 Statutory intervention has codified some of these common law principles. See CAL.
Civ. CODE § 47(3) (West 1995) (which provides a privilege for "a communication, without
malice, to a person interested therein... (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person
interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication
innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information"). This
statute, however, has not generally been extended to the media. See Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 771 P.2d 406 (Cal. 1989).
See also Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959)
(which created an absolute immunity provided for the media in the context of an equal time
provision for candidate access to the media). See Equal Opportunities Act § 315 (1934).
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made an error, liability could ensue even if the media had exercised due
care. 15 Furthermore, general damages encompassed mental distress
16
which could be presumed without proof by a jury.
Beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan17 in 1964, a series

of constitutional cases imposed dramatic restrictions on public plaintiffs'
rights to recovery. In the New York Times case, an Alabama public offi-

cial filed a defamation suit over an advertisement placed in the New York
Times. The insertion of the political advertisement was arguably negli-

gent because it made allegations that were inconsistent in fact with the
newspaper's previously published reportings relating to a local civil
rights demonstration.

The Alabama courts imposed massive damages based upon the limited circulation of the New York Times within the state.' 8 The state's
perceived hostility to the involvement of the New York Times in the civil
rights movement appeared to make the massive liability punitive under
the common law strict liability defamation standard of Alabama state
law, which was unfettered by any constitutional or other federal restraint. 19 The Alabama common law did provide for privileges which in
some instances could protect defendants, but these were limited and generally did not address defamation in the context of public controversy.
In New York Times, the Supreme Court required public officials to
prove "with convincing clarity" "actual malice" in order to award damages against media defendants.2 0 Constitutional actual malice is defined
15 Another privilege available to the media is the 'Fair Report' privilege based upon fair
and accurate reports of government activities or meetings. The essence of this privilege lies in
the simple communication of an occurrence, even if a statement made by a public figure reported upon was within the context of a lie. To establish liability information must be misquoted or inaccurate. Cf. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. New
York Times Co., 399 N.E.2d 1185 (N.Y. 1979) (finding no liability because a newspaper
article was not inaccurate just imprudent due to the unverifiable nature of the report).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (defining this privilege as limited to "a
meeting open to the public... deal[ing] with a matter of public concern").
16 See Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 231 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (finding that a plaintiff
may be entitled to compensatory damages including damages for his mental anguish and distress). See also CHARLES T. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 14 (1935)

(stating that such damage has been suffered is presumed and need not be proved by the
plaintiff).
17 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18 Such a basis for liability is often justified under the "single publication rule". At
common law each individual copy of a publication could be considered a separate cause of
action. The law currently treats an entire edition of a publication as a 'single publication'
which creates but one cause of action for damages. See UNIFORM SINGLE PUBLICATION Acr,
14 U.L.A. 377 (1952).
See also William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication,51 MIcH. L. REv. 959 (1953)
19 See E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20, and Ingber supra note 12.
20 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S.
323(1974) (limiting recovery to actual damages for falsity in cases by private plaintiffs, allowing punitive damages only when actual malice can be proven).
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as making a statement "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."'2 1 With the new actual malice
standard, the common law strict liability tort of defamation became a tort
requiring subjective and conscious wrongdoing.
The Supreme Court, when imposing this constitutional requirement,
noted the importance of encouraging robust political debate unintimidated by liability for unintended errors. 22 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court required public figures as well as public officials to prove actual
malice. The Court noted that public officers and public figures have
often, though not always, assumed the risk of defamation and other public disclosures by thrusting themselves into politics and other professions
23
associated with public notoriety.
The new actual malice standard resulted in substantially less media
regulation by the courts. 24 In effect, the media now enjoys an extreme
"limited duty" protection for reporting regarding public figure victims.
This trend in defamation law has also developed in torts protecting privacy.25 Courts have allowed the public disclosure of private facts when
the source of the facts is in the public record or is of legitimate public
interest. 26 Intentional infliction of mental distress has also been restricted so public figures cannot bring an action for media publications
unless, in essence, defamation under new constitutional standards can be
proved.27
21 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280. In Saint Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968) the Supreme Court defined recklessness toward the truth to require that the defendant
"in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." See also Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989) including within N.Y. Times
actual malice a "deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge." Constitutional actual malice in
the New York Times case should be distinguished from the common law malice which is
defined as constituting ill will, hatred, or reckless disregard of the plaintiffs rights.
22 Id. at 270.
23 See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967), where the Court noted,
"'public figures,' like 'public officials,' often play an influential role in ordering society. And
surely as a class these 'public figures' have ready access as 'public officials' to mass media of
communication, both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities."
24 See sources cited supra note 7.
25 See generally Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in
the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CI. L. REv. 722 (1963); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in
Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966).
26 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. d. See also The Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), where a reporter-trainee copied a rape victim's police report,
which was placed within a police press room, and then wrote a one paragraph story based upon
the report which was printed in the Florida Star. The Court held that "where a newspaper
publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order, and that
no such interest is satisfactorily served by imposing liability ... under the facts of this case."
Id. at 541.
27 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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The result of this constitutionalization of traditional media torts has
been a new equilibrium in government media regulation. In essence, the
New York Times case and its progeny have established a minimalist government intervention model by which only very extreme intentional media wrongdoing is sanctioned in the context of coverage of public

officials and figures. 28 This is in contrast with a government control
model, personified in traditional broadcast regulation, and a laissez faire
model relying totally on market forces.

It is the position of this essay that the new dominant minimalist
intervention model needs to be adjusted to encompass more elements
from the government control model. At present, media regulation for

public affairs has shifted too close to deregulation under the laissez faire
model.2 9

B.

THE LAissEz FAnRE MODEL

A very strong and well established position, espoused by the media
and many others, argues a laissez faire approach based on respect for the
First Amendment and market forces.3 0 The First Amendment protects
free speech in general and the free press in particular.3 1 Judicial scrutiny,
it is argued, is dangerous government intrusion because the marketplace
32
of ideas requires a forum for debate uninhibited by liability concerns.
Furthermore, the quality of media presentations should be dictated by
what the marketplace demands rather than imposed by government bu33
reaucrats or political ideologues.
28 See Paul A. LaBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation, An Accommodation of the
Competing Interests Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66 NEa. L. REV. 249
(1987), outlining the restrictions upon defamation liability, set out by New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, which include the requirements of proof of actual malice, the burden of proving
actual malice with convincing clarity, and independent appellate review.
29 See sources cited supra note 7.
30 See THOMAS IRWIN EMERSON, THE SYsTarm OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970);

Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Cases: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment", 1964 Sup. Cr. Rv. 191.
31 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32 "When ideas compete in the market place for acceptance, full and free discussion
exposes the false and they gain few adherents. Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate
encourages the testing of our own prejudices and preconceptions.... Full and free discussion
has indeed been the first article of our faith." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584
(1951) (Douglas, J.dissenting).
33 See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966), where the court reversed the FCC's decision that the plaintiffs were merely
members of the public, not entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding the alleged segregationist views of a local television broadcast licensee.
See also Comment, Recent Cases: Office of Communication of United Church of Christv.
FCC, 80 HAnv. L. REv. 670, 673-74 (1967), stating that "by expressly rejecting the assumption that the 'Commission can always effectively represent the listener interest in [license]
renewal proceedings' ... the present court's refusal to respect the FCC's view.., would seem
to be another manifestation of its distrust of the commission.' Id. at 673-74.
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GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL MODEL

An alternative to the laissez faire model is the government control
model.34 Under this model, the government plays a much more proactive role within (at least arguably) constitutional constraints. A variety of

doctrines reflect this approach, particularly in the regulation of broadcast
media. The fairness doctrine, upheld constitutionally for television and
radio, 35 requires a balanced presentation in the broadcasting of controversial issues.
The fairness doctrine, which had been imposed on television and
radio stations, had a two-pronged requirement that a station must broadcast controversial issues of public importance and ensure that significant
contrasting views are presented. Unlike the equal time provision for opposing candidates, the balance did not have to be exact nor was any proponent of an opposing view entitled to claim time. It was the station's
responsibility to strike this balance. However, the Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) has declined to enforce the fairness doctrine,
and Congress by one vote failed to override President Reagan's veto of a
statute imposing the doctrine on the F.C.C. An earlier court decision had
ruled that § 315 of the Communications Act, while acknowledging the

fairness doctrine, had not codified

it.36

In contrast to the fairness doctrine, the equal time provision requires
that opposing candidates receive equal opportunity to purchase or receive
free air time subject to exceptions like appearances on bona fide news
and interview programs. 37 Failure to conform to this provision could
result in sanctions against the licensee, including a possible license revocation by the F.C.C. Additionally, the news distortion rule imposes sanc34 "The reality is, of course, that the government itself participates in the system, both as
communicator and listener. This government participation is active, varied and extensive."
THOMAS IRwIN EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697 (1970). See also
Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press - A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967); Richard C. Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel,
34 VA. L. REv. 867 (1948); Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 1730 (1967); but see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
35 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367
(1969) (upholding constitutionality of fairness doctrine based on scarcity of frequencies for
licensing).
36 See 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974); Syracuse Peace Council, 57 R.R.2d 519 (1984) (concluding
that remnants of the Fairness Doctrine involving political campaign advertisements where the
candidate does not appear, complementing the equal time statute, survive).
37 See Communications Act of 1935 § 315, stating: "If any licensee shall permit any
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station,
he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station... "
For an example of an exception, see Columbia Broadcast System (Suez Crisis) 14 R.R.
720 (F.C.C. 1956), where President Eisenhower's Democratic opponent requested time equal
to that which was used by the President to discuss the explosion of war in the Middle East.
The networks refused and the commission upheld their stance.
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tions on broadcast stations for misleading news presentations. 38 All
39
licensing of broadcast stations is required to be in the public interest.
Consequently, stations are required to affirmatively identify and address
issues of public importance. 40 This aggressive government control has
been justified in light of the scarcity of airwaves which are exclusively
41
licensed by the government to the broadcaster.

D.

THE GOVERNMENT MNIMALIST INERVENTION MODEL

A third approach to media regulation allows for government sanc-

tions only in extreme cases. Current defamation law reflects this approach. 42 For the last three decades (but notably not before) defamation
law has been severely constrained by Supreme Court decisions. Beginning with New York Times, wrongful injury to the reputations of public
officials and public figures 43 transformed a system based on strict liability4 into a system requiring proof of subjective intentional wrongdoing.
Under the constitutional requirements imposed by New York Times,
the public officials or figures must prove "actual malice," a knowing
falsehood or conscious disregard as to its truth or falsity.4 5 Private
figures defamed in the context of a public controversy must merely prove
that the media acted with fault, but are limited to "actual damages" unless they can prove "actual malice." Actual damages is a relatively broad

concept that includes proving emotional and pecuniary losses attributable
to the defamation. 46 This constitutional protection provides a breathing
38 See Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C. 2d 143 (1969); Galloway v. F.C.C., 778 F.2d 16
(D.C. Cir. 1985). Although, in neither case did the court actually impose sanctions.
39 See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216, 224 (1943), where
the Court held that the Communications Act of 1934 "authorized the Commission to promulgate regulations designed to correct... abuses" and that the public interest to be served under
the Act is "the interest of the listening public." See also The Primer on Ascertainment of
Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).
40 See Rep. Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976), where the Commission held that a
radio station seeking to renew its license, which had refused to air an anti-strip mining tape on
the grounds that it had not aired the original pro-strip mining tape, showed an "unreasonable
exercise" of discretion in so doing. The station, by virtue of its location and the importance of
the issue of strip mining there, was found to have an affirmative obligation to air programs or
news stories relating to the issue.
41 See id.

42 See cases cited supra note 20.
43 This standard was upheld for public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
323 (1974).
44 See sources cited supra note 10.
45 Constitutional actual malice in the New York Times case should be distinguished from
the common law concept defined as constituting ill will, hatred, or reckless disregard of the
plaintiff's rights. Constitutional actual malice is defined as statements made "with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
46 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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space for robust reporting and debate.4 7 With regard to defamed public
officials and figures, negligent reporting is immunized. 4 8 For defamed
private figures, however, a recovery based upon negligent reporting is
49
possible.

E.

APPRAISING THE THREE MODELS

There are both merits and drawbacks to each of the approaches derived from the three models of media control. First, the laissez faire
model protects against governmental intrusion. On the other hand, it relies entirely on market forces to ensure a fair and quality presentation,
even when those market forces have limited effective competition. Second, the governmental control model, which, at least in theory, is prevalent in the more intensely regulated broadcast media, utilizes a
government commission to stimulate and arbitrate fairness and accuracy
in the media. It clearly poses, however, the dangers associated with government intrusion.50 A commission, appointed by politicians, arbitrates
51
vague concepts such as fairness and objectivity.
The third model, limited government intrusion, has become the
dominant system for regulating the media. In recent years, the broadcast
media have enjoyed (with the potential exception of indecency regulation) increasing deregulation.5 2 Furthermore, the fairness doctrine 53 and
equal time provisions 54 have never been applied to the print media where
47 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), where the court noted
the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."
48 Negligence constitutes unreasonable conduct below the professional standard and is an
objective standard, needing proof of conscious risks taking.
New York Times actual malice requires proof that the defendant subjectively knew of
falsity of a statement or was consciously aware of her absence of knowledge. This results in a
protection, and consequential absence of liability, for negligent reporting and reflects the concern over possible chilling effects liability for negligence could have upon free speech.
49 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974), noting that "so long as
they do not impose liability without fault, the states may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability .... "
50 Government intrusion can be characterized by increased government costs and altered
market incentives. While such altered incentives may seem favorable, the government's inability to respond effectively to market changes may result in a less efficient allocation of
goods, services, and resources.
The often cited solution to this problem is to adjust the market mechanism so as to internalize the externalities in order to correctly valuate an activity. Such a policy provides correct
marketplace incentives.
51 If this model were adopted, it is likely that the burden of regulating such affairs would
be placed upon the Federal Communications Commission.
52 See sources cited supra note 7.
53 See sources cited supra note 34.
54 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
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its application could raise constitutional questions. While the limited
government intrusion model avoids, by definition, many of the pitfalls
associated with governmental action, it falls short of providing adequate

protection from media negligence.
F. THE

INADEQUACY OF THE LIMITED GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION

MODEL

Constitutional defamation law does not create an incentive for journalists to be careful when reporting information concerning public
figures. By requiring subjective wrongdoing in the form of actual malice
there is no legal penalty or remedy for professional negligence. A jour-

nalist, contrary to the intent of defamation law, has a clear incentive to
make a "scoop" and reveal sensational information without an effort to
corroborate its truth.5 5 Carelessness, so long as it does not constitute a

conscious disregard for the truth, goes unsanctioned by law.5 6

In other professions, the utilitarian role of the law is deemed an
important adjunct to apprehension over diminished reputation. Medical

personnel have reputations and ethical responsibilities, as do the legal
professionals, but both are also subject to a professional negligence
57
standard.

As in other professions, the market could arguably provide a sanction for mistakes and false reporting. In fact, the media is arguably subject to more public and consumer scrutiny than the typical physician or
lawyer (the O.J. Simpson trial excepted). The individual journalist and

the media organization that disseminates her work risk embarrassment
and loss of credibility for dissemination of erroneous information. 5 8

Such scrutiny ostensibly discourages negligent conduct.
55 If the intent of defamation law is to prevent the spread of defamatory statements, this
is clearly contravened by a policy which does not hold a careless defendant liable. When the
market signals that carelessness does not result in liability a clear incentive exists to be careless in order to maintain a questionable but profitable story. This market signaling contravenes
the law's basic purpose of prevention of defamatory statements resulting in inefficiency, uncertainty as to liability, and increased information costs. Arguably, such effects are not necessary to avoid the chilling of free speech.
56 Some argue that this is a necessary breathing space for the effective protection of the
first amendment. But see Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U.
Cm. L. REv. 782, 802-813 (1986), arguing that a media defendant may not know its own selfinterest and that reducing such breathing space and allowing the imposition of strict liability
may actually save more in economic terms.
57 See JomH

L. DiuAoND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE AND M. STUmT MADDEN, UNDER-

STANDING ToRTs (1995) at §§ 7.02-7.04; PRossmr & KErON, ToRTs (5th ed. 1984) at § 32.
58 The basic premise of this argument is that negative public reaction will cause a decline
in sales, subscribers, and profits. Query whether such an incentive exists if only its reputation
for truth were affected and not its sales or profits.
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The media, however, arguably benefits from such conduct, while
the legal, medical, and other professions do not.5 9 While negligence in
other professions can also bring benefits in terms of savings and perhaps
some initial consumer satisfaction, documented negligence in other professions is ordinarily accompanied, when perceived, by negative market
reactions. In contrast, a reputation for sensationalism and unsupported
speculation can, in some cases, increase media circulation or ratings.
Shows like "A Current Affair" and publications like "The National Enquirer" profit more through their entertainment value than through their
reputations as rarefied and thoughtful sources of news. Accuracy and
legitimate scoops are a plus, but disseminating exciting rumors, whether
true or not, generates profitability in the media.
Due to its necessary reliance on conflicting market forces and the
lenient control provided by the actual malice standard, the limited governmental intrusion model is clearly inadequate to the task of encouraging responsible media action in the context of public figure reporting.
II.

TOWARD INCREASED MEDIA LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY:
A PROPOSAL

A.

THE ARGUMENT AGAINST NEGLIGENCE

Should negligence liability be a component of media responsibility
in the context of public figure reporting? 60 Would negligence liability
threaten free discourse?
One may argue that while negligence, in principle, excuses reasonable errors and mistakes, potentially massive liability associated with
59 When the media actually reaps a profit from such conduct, one possible result is a
market which favors false but profitable and entertaining information over responsible reporting of verifiable events. This could result in increased profits for those companies which
engage in false or negligent reporting. Arguably, society as a whole would suffer a net loss. A
net losses would likely result because higher information costs within a market decrease the
market's ability to function efficiently.
60 This debate has been the subject of numerous articles which have questioned the constitutional standard of New York Times and explored possible alternative reforms. See Stanley
Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA. L. REv. 785 (1979);
Marc A. Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18
U.S.F. L. Ray. 1 (1983); David A. Barrett, DeclaratoryJudgments ForLibel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REv. 847 (1986); Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan
Wrong?, 53 U. Cm. L..REv. 782 (1986); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to CurrentLibel Law, 74 CAL. L. REv. 809 (1986); Paul A. LeBel, Reforming the Tort of
Defamation, An Accommodation of the Competing Interests within the CurrentConstitutional
Framework, 66 NEa. L. REv. 249 (1987); Pierre N. Leval, The No Money, No FaultLibel Suit:
Keeping Sullivan in its ProperPlace, 101 HAav. L. REv. 1287 (1988); Rodney A. Smolla &
Michael J. Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal:The Casefor Enactment, 31 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 25 (1989); Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law
Through Uniform Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REv. 293
(1994).
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vigorous coverage arguably can deter aggressive coverage. The cost of
litigation and the uncertainty of jury verdicts may create a chilling effect
on the kinds of coverage and reporting in which some, particularly less
wealthy, media might engage. Arguably, this risk, along with the notion
that public officials and figures voluntarily assume their status and the
risks associated with it, warrants protection of the media against unlimited civil negligence liability. 61 A liability threshold higher than mere
negligence is further justified because it is very difficult to define what
constitutes a reasonable mistake. Additionally, political and ideological
tensions could result in extreme penalties. The facts of the New York
Times case suggest that ideological debate alone can prompt punitive
62
sanctions against inevitable negligent errors.
Nonetheless, it is wrong to completely immunize negligent error.
The public benefits from competent journalistic scrutiny; the public does
not benefit from negligent reporting. Such reporting can result in serious
harm to individuals from defamation. Since the underlying impetus for
the immunity from negligence liability is the intent to avoid discouraging
non-negligent journalistic coverage, it is quite plausible that other remedies are possible that would discourage negligent journalism but not dis63
courage vigorous journalism.
The problem poses a two-pronged question. First, what is the ideal
approach? Second, what approaches are available which do not require
changing constitutional doctrine?

B.

THE IDEAL APPROACH

Protection for the media based on damage liability limitations rather
than protection based on heightened culpability standards would appear
preferable.6 4 The Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.6 5 attempted this approach when private plaintiffs were defamed in the context of a public controversy. Fault, not actual malice, was required but
only for recovery of "actual" damages. Unlimited damage recovery, in61 Public figures may gain their notoriety incidental to their professional or personal
pursuits. See, e.g., Mezropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977); Carson v. Allied News,
529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
62 Note that strict liability was all that needed to be established under Alabama state law.
63 The possibility of other remedies relies on a presumption that vigorous journalism and
negligence liability aren't mutually exclusive. That these are mutually exclusive is more than
debatable, as this proposal suggests. The deterrence effect of money damages on vigorous
journalism by publishers will be lowered or lost if damages are kept low and only allowed
upon a finding of negligence.
64 Limitations on damages address both plaintiff and defendant concerns. Plaintiffs receive the increased possibility of revealing the truth, and defendants have their vigorous journalistic efforts protected by lower damage awards imposed only upon a finding of negligence.
65 See cases cited supra note 20.
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cluding punitive damages, would require clear and convincing proof of
66
actual malice.
The concept of "actual" damages is, however, extremely broad.
While it excludes "presumed" damages 67 and punitive damages, emotional damages are not excluded. 68 Unfortunately, such emotional damages are extremely difficult to translate into monetary value. Economic
losses or special damages, on the other hand, may be determined with
more precision. It can, however, be difficult to ascertain or measure even
economic losses when the injured entity is not a conventional business,
but is a new business, an unconventional business, or a political
69
reputation.
Nevertheless, there is substantial precedent for limiting recoveries
in defamation cases to special damages in the context of retraction statues. 70 California, for example, limits recovery for newspapers, radio,
and television to special damages if there is a timely retraction. 7 1 Other
publications, such as "The National Enquirer," which a California appellate court characterized as a magazine for the purposes of the retraction
statute, 72 are not protected. The court justified this characterization by
noting that magazines are subject to less deadline pressure than newspa73
pers and the broadcast media.
Retraction statutes existed long before the New York Times case.
Now, such retraction statutes exist in conjunction with the constitutionally imposed actual malice standard. While such statutes did not exist in
Alabama, their co-existence with constitutional protections gives certain
media extreme immunity. 74 In California, for example, a public figure
plaintiff must prove actual malice and falsity of an objective fact as a
prerequisite to recovery. If the newspaper or broadcast outlet responds in
a timely manner with a retraction, it is protected even when the degree of
66 See id.
67 Presumed damages allow juries in defamation cases to award damages without proof
of loss. "[Diamage is presumed from proof of wrongdoing." MCCORMICK, supra note 16.
68 See Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 231 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1962) and MCCORMICK, supra
note 16.
69 See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989)
(judicial candidate who lost an election sued and won $5,000 in damages and $95,000 in
punitive damages from a newspaper which had harmed his reputation).
70 Retraction statutes often limit recovery to special damages when an appropriate retraction has been made, thus foreclosing the possibility of punitive or mental distress damageg.
Today, approximately half the states have retraction statutes.
71 CAL. CiviL CODE § 48a (West 1995).
72 Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
73 In order to distinguish the Enquirer from a newspaper, the court characterized newspapers as engaged in the "immediate dissemination of news." Id. at 213.
74 See Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 216 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1950),
dismissed on motion of counsel for the appellant, 340 U.S. 910 (1951) (upholding the California retraction statute which limited damages even when the defamation was intentional).

1996]

RETHINKING MEDIA LIABILITY

culpability would otherwise justify compensation for emotional injury
and punitive damages. 75 The plaintiff can only recover special or pecuniary losses resulting from the defamation.
While not all retraction statutes are identical, the remedy in many

ways reflects a legislative response to a problem that a federal constitutional mandate has largely usurped.76 Constitutional standards have dramatically altered the balance between free debate, including the risk of
occasional error, and public discourse. The New York Times standard,

while proper in motive and concern, has precluded other solutions. Indeed, basing liability solely on conscious culpable wrongdoing has had
the unfortunate impact of justifying civil litigation discovery inquiries
77
into a reporter's mind and her confidential sources.
Negligence is the dominant system of legal liability for professional
error. 78 It ideally punishes only inefficient behavior which fails to take
proper but not excessive precautions.7 9 In the context of First Amend-

ment values, requiring only negligence to recover damages but limiting
recovery to special damages if a retraction is made after a judicial determination of falsity would more effectively serve the purpose of defama-

tion law than requiring intentional or reckless culpability to obtain
unlimited damages. In the absence of negligence, there would be no
liability.
Arguably, such an approach even increases the protection afforded
media.8 0 It would allow media to defer a retraction until the hearing and
still not risk damages in excess of special damages. In any event, injured
75 Id.
76 Previously, retraction statutes allowed a correction in order to avoid strict liability
thereby providing some insulation to the press. Now, under the New York Times standard, no
liability is established unless the case involves reckless or intentional defamation thereby providing the sought for insulation for vigorous reporting.
77 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). CBS, producer of "60 Minutes," was
required to respond to court inquiries concerning why certain investigations were untaken at
deposition. This was considered relevant because journalist thought processes were found
pertinent in establishing constitutional malice as a prerequisite to recovery.
78 JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C.

LEvnI,

AN M. STUART MADDEN,

UNDERSTANDING

TORTS (1995) at §§ 3.01-3.02; PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS, at §§ 28-30.
79 Professional liability for error raises serious questions. Total liability for reasonable
risks of error would discourage innovation and overdeter the development or expansion of
information. For this reason, I would not impose special damages for a determination of falsity without fault. See Ingber, supra note 12, advocating this position in part. However, absence of adequate liability may result in questionable activities which may not be in the
patient's or client's best interest. Negligence, as a standard, recognizes the importance of both
of these goals and ideally imposes liability when one interest is allowed to unreasonably prevail over the other. It may be argued that the information costs of determining possible liability would be high, but the societal benefits of such a flexible standard would most likely
outweigh such costs. See id.
80 See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Cm. L. REv.
782, 802 (1986) (noting that "it is possible that the actual malice rule has made the situation
worse for media defendants than it would be under a sensible strict liability rule.").
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individuals can recover for true out-of-pocket losses. Equally important,
the media will be provided with some incentive to be cautious initially
and a strong incentive to retract an error once it is specifically determined as such. 81
In this sense, the retraction type approach resembles the equal time
and fairness doctrines in the government control model. 82 Instead of
viewing control simply as a liability issue, there is a corrective effort to
influence the media's presentation. Under the equal time provision and
to a large extent under the fairness doctrine, advocates of opposing positions can demand balanced access to the media. Failure to provide such
access when required could result in sanctions against the broadcast licensee. In an analogous manner, retraction statutes provide sanctions for
the failure to respond to a request, in this instance, for an acknowledgment of error.
Such a system relies more on altering the media's presentation and
less on draconian sanctions, unless the media chooses to assume the risk
by declining the retraction. 83 Accidental error leads to limited liability,
creating the incentive for caution, but not punitive liability. The New
York Times actual malice standard protects the media from any liability
for accidental error, but all protection is lost if the plaintiff can establish
conscious disregard for the truth. 84 The focus is not on correction but on
litigating the state of mind of the journalist. 85 In short, the New York
Times solution of balancing media responsibility with First Amendment
86
protection appears to be strategically questionable.
C.

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION WITHIN THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL

FRAMEWORK

Given the existence of the New York Times standard as a constitutional parameter, I argue for a dispute resolution 87 model which lowers
81 Note that defamation is one area in which remedies of retraction or publication of truth

may be a more appropriate devices than simple money damages.
82 See supra notes 33-35.
83 Arguably, this is an effective device for market functioning because it addresses inaccurate information within the market by providing a correction for inaccuracy and damages for
negligence in producing such inaccuracy. This type of corrective effort encourages accurate
information, which lowers costs for most transactions, or at least prevents such transaction
costs from rising.
84 See supra note 56.
85 See Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 216 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1950).
86 See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Cm. L. REv.

782, 808-10 (1986) (arguing that litigating the state of mind of the defendant results in a
deadweight social loss due to the nature of the current consumption of funds needed to finance
the litigation. The costs of litigation include administrative and uncertainty costs).
87 Dispute resolution avoids civil delays in courts and can provide a more timely and
equitable remedy without being constrained by constitutional mandates not beneficial to either
party.
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the culpability threshold in exchange for lowering the maximum damage
liability. The media defendant and public figure complainant agree to
arbitrate the accuracy of the alleged defamation. A finding of negligence, in addition to inaccuracy, requires payment of special damages.
In this regard, the media is surrendering the protection of the New
York Times standard. The plaintiff surrenders, however, the possibility
of proving the New York Times actual malice standard and recovering
more than special damages. Emotional and punitive damages are unavailable, vastly limiting the potential liability of the media. Both parties, however, benefit from a quicker, more efficient system of
determining liability.
Such arbitrated dispute resolution arrangements allow the experimentation that the constitutionalization of media liability has, unfortunately, largely precluded. 88 Ultimately, liability for media abuses would
be integrated into a system that depends more on corrective resolution8 9
and less on economic devastation. Unfortunately, the New York Times
case and its constitutional progeny have stilted more creative experimentation to preserve First Amendment values but ensure responsibility for
malicious errors and injuries of public officials and figures by a prolific
and powerful industry.
III.
A.

THE

COMPARISON WITH ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PROPOSALS

Professors Marc Franklin and David Barrett have proposed two similar yet significantly different proposals to reform defamation law. 90
Both recognize flaws in the New York Times actual malice approach to
defamation of public figures and both propose declaratory judgment procedures as a core reform.
Under the declaratory judgment system, a court would determine
the truth or falsity of an alleged defamation without requiring any mental
culpability as defined by negligence or New York Times actual malice.
88 The constitutional doctrine of New York Times actual malice has foreclosed opportunities for experimentation with policies that provide greater protection or restitution to plaintiffs
while continuing to encourage robust debate. This is a premise upon which retraction statutes
were originally developed.
89 The concept of corrective resolution recognizes that defamation is a unique area of the
law in which retractions and perhaps other alternative remedies may provide an adequate alternative to or supplement for money damages.
90 See Good Names and Bad Law, supra note 4; Declaratory Judgment Alternative,
supranote 4; Barrett, supra note 5. Professor Barrett's position was embodied in H.R. 2846, a
federal libel proposal introduced by Congressman Charles Schumer in 1985 to stimulate discussion. See also Professor Robert M. Ackerman's proposal, arguing for a declaratory judgment scheme as well, but allowing both public and private plaintiffs to recover special
damages, attorney fees, and the cost of publishing vindication if New York Times malice were
established. Robert M. Ackerman, 72 N.C. L. Rnv. 293 (1994).

304

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5:289

In essence, falsity would be litigated without reference to fault. While
this would constitute strict liability, the only remedy provided under the
declaratory judgment scheme would be the publicity of the court's ruling. No monetary damages would be afforded to the plaintiff, although
attorney fees could be shifted to the losing party. 91
While the two proposals approach fault similarly, they differ regarding a party's ability to choose a declaratory judgment remedy in lieu of a
damage action. Professor Barrett would allow either the plaintiff or the
defendant to opt for declaratory judgment litigation 92 exclusively and,
consequently, eliminate the possible recovery (aside from the cost of litigation) of any monetary damages suffered by the plaintiff for the alleged
defamation. 93 Professor Franklin, on the other hand, would allow only
the plaintiff to substitute a declaratory judgment in place of a damage
94
action.
Professor Franklin criticizes Professor Barrett's proposal for allowing a defendant to elect the declaratory judgment action because such
an approach denies the plaintiff monetary recovery and strongly immunizes the media from liability. 95 Professor Barrett supports his proposal
91 Under Professor Franklin's proposal fee shifting for litigation costs would not be
awarded under certain circumstances. For example, under the declaratory judgment provision
a prevailing defendant would not be awarded attorneys' fees if the plaintiff had "a reasonable
chance of success and presented, or formally tried to present to the defendant evidence that the
statement was false and defamatory before the action was filed." DeclaratoryJudgmentAlternative, supra note 4, at 813. A prevailing plaintiff would not recover if the plaintiff prevailed
based on evidence that was not presented or formally attempted to be presented before the
action was filed. Professor Franklin also would allow fee shifting under certain circumstances
in damages action where New York Times malice is established.
Professor Barrett would shift attorney's fees to the losing party in defamation actions
except where the court finds "an overriding reason" to disallow or reduce the award or if a
defendant defeated in the action proves it exercised reasonable efforts to ascertain the publication was not false and defamatory or published a retraction within 10 days after an action was
filed. Id. at 834-835.
92 See Barrett, supra note 5 at 864-65 (arguing that "[bly giving defendants, as well as
plaintiffs, the option to choose a declaratory judgment, the bill creates a remedy that forcefully
implements the goal." This goal is encompassed by elimination of high costs, increased efficiency of adjudication, and lowering overall social costs.
93 Id. at 853 (stating that "the root of the present libel crisis lies in the fact that reputation
can be injured by words, but the common law offers redress only in the form of money
damages.")
But see Rosenblatt v. Baere, 383 U.S. 75, 93 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). Stewart
stated "imperfect though it is, an action for damages is the only hope for vindication or redress
the law gives to a man whose reputation has been falsely dishonored."
94 See DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative, supra note 4, at 836 (stating that the defendant's ability to elect is "objectionable because it (1) is unfair to all plaintiffs, especially those
with special damages; (2) shows premature willingness to concede society's inability to handle
intentional defamatory falsehoods; (3) destroys a longstanding tort remedy without a showing
that less drastic alternatives are not available; and (4) is politically unattractive.")
95 See generally DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative, supra note 4, at 841, outlining the
two possible alternatives: (A) if plaintiffs think they have a strong case of actual malice, de-
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by arguing that the negative publicity from an adverse ruling would deter
the media from making defamatory statements. In addition, Professor
Barrett notes that if the media loses, it would be forced to pay attorney
96
fees.
In commenting on the Franklin-Barrett dispute, Professor Jerome

Skolnick observes that "Barrett's proposal values 'truth' as the major
goal of libel law in light of free speech and dignitarian concerns. Franklin. .. sympathizes with the victim who has suffered economic as well as
97
dignitary harm because of falsity."

Franklin argues that some significant number of plaintiffs will elect
a declaratory judgment without damages because they are unlikely to win
98
a defamation suit where the New York Times actual malice is required.
Furthermore, a defendant would be motivated to issue a retraction rather
than litigate a declaratory judgment claim because such a retraction
would avoid litigation costs and the award of attorney fees sustained by a
successful plaintiff.99
Professor Barrett argues that allowing defendants to immunize

themselves from any monetary liability (except their own and a successful plaintiff's litigation costs) by opting for declaratory judgment litigation "is a fair and necessary trade-off for the parties in light of social
interests, particularly the first amendment interest in robust debate."' 00
fendants will opt for a declaratory judgment, and (B) if plaintiffs believe a statement is false
but cannot prove actual malice, they will opt for a declaratory judgment.
Thus, when actual malice exists, defendants would invoke the privilege. Therefore, the
damage action would rarely be used.
96 In the present day media environment, where values of entertaining and sensational
information predominately increase ratings, it is unlikely that deterrence would be achieved
through the shifting of attorneys fees. Even if it could be achieved through this approach, a
principal function of tort law is to repair the injury to the plaintiff.
97 Jerome H. Skolnick, Foreword: The Sociological Tort of Defamation, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 677, 681 (1986).
98 See Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and
What Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REv. 789 (1986) (finding that plaintiffs' rate of success was
approximately 10%).
99 Professor Barrett's proposal is restricted to public plaintiffs and media defendants.
Professor Franklin's proposal applies to private and public plaintiffs and non-media as well as
media defendants. Professor Franklin unlike Professor Barrett would require private as well as
public plaintiffs to prove New York Times malice to recover any damages. This is a higher
culpability than required by Gertz (see supra note 20 and accompanying text), which allows
private plaintiffs to recover "actual damages" if only "fault" is established. Professor Franklin
argues falsity is too close to negligence: "It is a small jump from finding an error to concluding that someone in the operation behaved unreasonably - either by failure to check with still
another source or by failing to wait another day until the plaintiff could be reached." See
DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative, supra note 4, at 824. He further argues that mere negligence liability for private plaintiffs hurts small media because relatively prominent community
figures, such as bankers, often would still be characterized as private plaintiffs.
100 Barrett, supra note 5, at 882.
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In effect, even intentional defamation is immunized under Professor Barrett's proposal. Professor Barrett argues that:
[dienying plaintiffs the right to damages is a fair price to
exact in return for the creation of a far more efficient
method of vindication. In contrast to their currently dismal five to ten percent success rate, plaintiffs may well
win most declaratory judgment actions. With such a
swift and sure remedy, plaintiffs who sue are likely to be
quite confident of their claims and suits by "guilty plaintiffs" should decline. From the defendants' perspective,
the threat of bankrupting damage judgments will be reduced under the Franklin proposal and eliminated by the
Schumer bill [embodying the Barrett position]. With
millions of dollars in potential liability no longer at
stake, litigation costs will plummet, hastened by the attorneys' fee-shifting provisions included in both proposals. The chilling effect of potential liability on the press
should therefore diminish considerably.
Finally, declaratory judgments will serve the public
interest by allowing courts to make prompt determinations of accuracy. Transaction costs will be reduced, and
the false statement - whether made by the defendant's
challenged report or by the plaintiff's complaint of falsity - will quickly stand exposed. Accurate information will strengthen the quality of public debate and will
discourage unfounded suits by guilty plaintiffs.
The notion that some plaintiffs must forego monetary compensation for reputational injury in the interest
of implementing broader social goals is not new. The
common law of libel has always recognized privilege defenses as a means of implementing other social goals.' 0 1
The Annenberg proposal utilizes a declaratory judgment scheme
10 2
that divides the resolutions of disputes into a multi-stage process.
First, the plaintiff must make a request for a retraction or an opportunity
1 0 3 If
to reply prior to the initiation of a declaratory judgment proceeding.
a retraction is made or the plaintiff fails to request one within thirty days,
101 Id. at 863-64.
102 See Rodney A. Smolla & Michael J. Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal:
The Case For Enactment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 25,32 (1989).
103 Id. However, the use of a mandatory request for a retraction or reply has been
criticized.
As Smolla and Gaertner noted, Judge Pierre N. Leval has attacked this mechanism on
several fronts:
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the plaintiff is precluded from further action. If no retraction is made to
the plaintiff's timely request, however, the plaintiff may then institute
further proceedings. Upon institution of further proceedings, either the
plaintiff or defendant may opt for a non-damage declaratory judgment
resolution.
When either party chooses the path of declaratory judgment the
court makes a determination of the truth or falsity of the statement. In
such a situation, the plaintiff gives up the possibility of recovering damages and the defendant loses the protection of the actual malice standard.
The losing party, however, is responsible for the prevailing party's attorney's fees. Finally, if neither of the parties opt for a declaratory judgment proceeding, then a defamation suit for damages proceeds under the
10 4
present day framework of New York Times.
Under the Annenberg proposal, as in the proposals by Professors
Franklin and Barrett, truth or falsity would be determined without reference to fault and no monetary damages would be available, with the exception of the shifting of attorney's fees or the alternative of a traditional
damages suit based upon actual malice under current constitutional law
governing public plaintiffs. In addition, the proposal also eliminates the
distinction between media and non-media defendants.
The Annenberg proposal, like Professor Barrett's proposal, allows
either the plaintiff or the defendant to opt for a declaratory judgment
proceeding. In developing this proposal, concerns about the overprotection and immunization of the media were seen as secondary to the stated
purpose of the Act, which was designed "to provide an efficient and
speedy remedy for defamation, emphasizing the compelling public interest in the dissemination of truth in the market-place."' 0 5
Such a policy, however, would eliminate damages even when the
most egregious and intentional violations occur. Enactment of the Annenberg proposal would allow intentionally defamatory remarks to be

First, the Act limits the reply to the plaintiffs own statement; the plaintiff is unable
to append supporting statements of knowledgeable third parties. Second .... the
restriction on the length of the reply [was] unreasonable. Third; the Act limits the
plaintiff's reply to "rebuttal of the defamatory statements," with the result, for example, that the plaintiff would be unable to demonstrate the publisher's malicious
intent.
Id. at 37-38.
104 The Annenberg proposal under § 7 established proof of negligence by clear and convincing evidence as the minimum level of fault for defamation actions leading to damage
awards, recognizing that the judiciary currently imposes a higher culpability standard for public figures.
105 Smolla, supra note 3, at 53.
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made at the simple cost of a later retraction.10 6 This would contravene
an important purpose of defamation policy.
B.

PROPOSED UNIFORM CORRECTION OF DEFAMATION STATUTE

The Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act was
adopted in 1993 by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws to serve as a model for enactment by state legislatures.10 7 In order
for a plaintiff to maintain an action for defamation, the Correction Act
requires that either the plaintiff make a request from the defendant for
correction or clarification within 90 days after learning of the publication
or alternatively that the defendant voluntarily make a correction or clarification.10 8 Plaintiffs requesting a correction after the 90-day period will
be limited to recovering only provable economic loss. Section 1(3) of
the Act defines economic loss as "special, pecuniary loss caused by the
publication." Thus, a plaintiff who does not make a timely request for
correction will be unable to recover general damages for pain, suffering,
embarrassment, humiliation or loss of reputation. If a timely and sufficient correction is made by the defendant, the plaintiff will once again
only be allowed to recover provable economic loss. If a timely correction is no longer possible, the defendant may offer to make a correction,
but the offer must also include the payment of the plaintiff's attorney's
fees incurred before publication of the correction. A plaintiff in this instance will be able to recover only for provable economic loss and attorney's fees incurred before the offer.
The Uniform Act provides limited additional protection to both the
media defendant and the plaintiff. Recovery is limited to special damages only when the media acquiesces once a timely retraction is sought
by the plaintiff.10 9 In this manner it is similar to some current retraction
statutes such as exist in California. Any judicially fought dispute over
the accuracy of the alleged defamation requires the high stakes litigation
that currently exists. The public plaintiff may recover massive general
106 The nature of a retraction and the limitation of this remedy would allow the cost of
wrongful conduct to be estimated and consequently weighed. When the cost of an intentionally defamatory remark can be readily determined, a potential defamer could determine that

the probable profits or income they will receive will be in excess of these costs and hence opt
for intentionally defamatory yet profitable stories. This would clearly do injustice and some
remedy in such cases should therefore be provided.
107 See supra note 6. The Act is derived from a more comprehensive proposal by the

drafting committee to revise defamation law that was withdrawn from consideration after opposition. See Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through Uniform
Legislation: The Searchfor an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REv. 293 (1994).

108 The Uniform Code allows specific allegations of defamation in a complaint to constitute a request for correction or clarification. § 3(c).
109 Indeed, an untimely retraction still limits recovery to special damages and litigation
costs.
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damages for emotional distress and potentially punitive damages as well,
but would obtain no compensation without first proving New York Times
malice. High culpability is a prerequisite to obtaining damages.
To a significant extent, the proposal would decrease the plaintiff's
protection, where a similar retraction statute is not already in existence.110 The media can act with intentional or reckless disregard toward
the truth, constituting New York Times actual malice culpability, and immunize itself from all but economic damages with a subsequent timely
retraction.
What the plaintiff gains by the proposal is similar to what the declaratory judgment proposals afforded - a form of public correction. In
this case, the correction is made by the media without judicial intervention in order to avoid the danger of greater liability. The plaintiff arguably benefits by receiving a retraction when no remedy whatsoever could
be obtained without establishing the requisite New York Times actual
malice for public plaintiffs. The public plaintiff remains, however, without any economic compensation without proving New York Times actual
malice and. is limited to special damages even with actual malice when
the media defendant has published a timely retraction.
C.

A CRITIQUE OF

THE PROPOSALS

My proposal, as described, differs very substantially from the declaratory judgment procedure advanced by both Professors Franklin and
Barrett, as well as the Annenberg Proposal. First, it is limited to public
plaintiffs as current constitutional jurisprudence would define it, although
I acknowledge that there is a good argument for expanding my proposal
to private plaintiffs involved in a matter of public controversy or concern. The public controversy standard has already been developed for
litigation under Gertz and privacy liability scenarios. My proposal
would not apply, in any event, to purely private defamation under the
Franklin model.'
Secondly, for reasons I will discuss below, it does not include a
non-damage declaratory judgment option for either party as do the Barrett and Annenberg models or for the plaintiff as does the Franklin
model. The Annenberg, Franklin, and Barrett models dispense with culpability as an issue unless the applicable parties fail to elect the nondamage declaratory judgment. If the parties fail to elect a declaratory
110 For a discussion of states' current use of retraction statutes and constitutional challenges, see Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through Uniform
Legislation: The Searchfor an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REv. 293 (1994).

111 See supra notes 91 and 99.
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judgment, then public plaintiffs, and private ones under the Franklin
model, must prove New York Times actual malice. 112
My proposal requires that public figures prove negligence but limits
recovery to special damages if the media promptly retracts the error upon
a finding of falsity. The media, by retracting the error earlier, may mitigate the victim's economic losses, thereby reducing potential liability.
New York Times actual malice would be limited to the unusual occasion
where the media on principle declines to retract despite a finding of negligence and falsity. At that juncture, the current high-stakes battle under
present constitutional defamation law reappears. The media is liable for
special damages under the finding of negligence 1 3 but will have to pay
general and perhaps punitive damages if a subsequent hearing finds ac114
tual malice.
Under a dispute resolution procedure, the parties could, as I indicated above, agree to a negligence and falsity hearing.' 15 The plaintiff in
that instance surrenders the potential for recovery of more than special
damages while the media surrenders the protection of New York Times
actual malice.
The Franklin, Barrett, and Annenberg models use declaratory judgments as a public relations remedy to clarify the truth and vindicate the
defamed party or the wrongly accused publisher. As Professor Barrett
argues, "declaratory judgments will serve the public interest by allowing
116
courts to make prompt determinations of accuracy."
The purpose of declaratory judgments, however, is to advise a litigant of legal responsibility and potential future liability if a particular
course of conduct is followed. It clarifies the law so that the litigant can
avoid a violation of that law. A litigant that does not conform to the
judgment risks liability for damages and, potentially, even criminal liability in some factual contexts.
The declaratory judgment proposals are a fundamental misuse of the
judicial system. First and foremost, courts do not determine historical
112 The Annenberg proposal, while requiring a minimum culpability level of negligence,
recognizes that courts currently impose a higher culpability standard for public figures. See
supra note 104.

113 This provides an incentive to avoid negligent conduct but only results in the payment
of special damages if such negligence occurs. Thus, the harmed plaintiff is compensated and
sufficient latitude is left for robust debate.
114 This is justified because this situation ultimately embodies the circumstances in which
punitive damages are peculiarly appropriate - namely, when a defendant consciously or recklessly causes damages to another.
115 Mutual gains for voluntary exchange are self apparent and are preferable to a nonmutual option in which each party can force a settlement situation by opting for a declaratory
judgment. Here, the arena for the exchange is simply being created rather than forced upon the
individual actors.
116 Barrett, supra note 5, at 863.
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truths. Their fact finding process is abbreviated (not withstanding the 0.
J. Simpson trial) and is not a substitute for historical research and con-.
temporary debate. Courts must determine facts as an expediency to the
political and legal necessity of determining civil or criminal liability. As
a fact finding process, the judicial adversary system has many limitations. Indeed, in the civil context, trials only determine what is more
likely than not a fact. The pendulum need only tip slightly.
This is not to say that trials do not serve a purpose. Legal liabilities
must be determined and remedies provided. The state must act on the
facts that it ascertains. Yet, I submit that it is wrong to tell the New York
Times or Washington Post and the public that the government has determined the truth and thereby vindicated the defamed, the publisher, the
media, or a private individual. In short, trials create working adjudicative facts because of the demands of tort law. The courts and other governmental agencies should not be independent purveyors of the official
truth. Should and could the truth about Watergate, Vietnam and General
Westmoreland, or the Iran-Contra affair depend on one trial and one

jury?
The declaratory judgment proposals also overestimate the remedial
impact of a quasi-retraction or repudiation of a defamatory charge. Reputations can be damaged with economic consequences. Despite his acquittal, it is unlikely that 0. J. Simpson will resume his endorsements for
Hertz. Indeed, the Franklin model includes private plaintiffs 1 7 where
the results of declaratory judgments may not even be publicized at all or
with the same intensity as a tantalizing charge.
It also appears to be a misuse of overtaxed judicial resources to use
courts for non-remedial truth finding. Indeed, in some jurisdictions civil
trials are already delayed for years because of the priority given to criminal cases and the existing civil case backlog.
Professor Barrett's proposal and the Annenberg model also pose a
very serious problem by allowing the defendant, in addition to the plaintiff, to elect a strict liability declaratory judgment without damage remedies in lieu of a New York Times actual malice damage action." 8 In
essence, there is an immunity option from damages even for the most
egregious intentional defamation. Professor Barrett justifies this result
under his model by citing empirical studies indicating that plaintiffs are
rarely successful in overcoming the New York Times actual malice standard. His proposal provides a remedy in the form of judicial vindication.
117 Declaratory Judgment Alternative, supra note 4, at 823-825. Professor Franklin
would not, however, compel any plaintiffs to relinquish the right to seek damages, but would
require all plaintiffs to prove New York Times actual malice to recover damages.
118 Smolla, supra note 3; Barrett, supra note 4.
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Professor Barrett's observation is correct. The New York Times actual malice standard results in a very limited media accountability. Consequently, my proposal reduces the culpability requirement to
negligence. Both Professors Franklin and Barrett reject negligence as
being too easy a finding for the jury once a factual defamatory error is
determined.
The Uniform Correction Act does not, at least, preclude the plaintiff
from recovering special damages even when the defendant has issued a
retraction. As such, the Uniform Correction Act improves upon the declaratory judgment proposals. The Uniform Correction Act does nothing, however, to reduce the public plaintiff's burden of proving New York
Times actual malice to recover any compensatory damages. Indeed, the
public plaintiff who can establish that the defendant acted with New York
Times actual malice is precluded by a timely retraction from recovering
more than special damages.
The media can act with negligence, indeed even with reckless or
intentional culpability, and still limit recovery to economic losses that
many public figures may find difficult to prove. The "upside" for the
public plaintiff - the incentive to retract after a sensational article has
been recklessly or negligently published - appears neither a large disincentive to the media to be irresponsible nor true compensation for the
wronged victim. My proposal imposes special damages when the media
retracts after a finding of only negligence.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Admittedly, negligence - what is unreasonable under the circumstances - is a vague concept and even the most conscientious juries may
occasionally mistake reasonable error for negligence. As discussed
above, however, I believe that the margin of protection should be limits
on the penalties - namely special damages for proven economic loss
caused by negligence resulting in false defamatory statements. Negligence provides an incentive for caution, but the limit to special damages
controls the potential liability.
My proposal recognizes the legitimate injuries defamation can cause
and the abuses that the media, often an entertainment enterprise, can inflict. The penalties are measured but real. If the defendant publisher
fails to retract once negligence and falsity are established, the plaintiff
can attempt to prove New York Times actual malice and receive all damages in addition to the special damages that would have been awarded.
In this way, the media has a strong incentive to retract. On the other
hand, the media can stand by their story by refusing to pay the special
damages and refusing to retract. In essence, the media is allowed, on
principle, to dispute the court's decision. Full general and, potentially,

19961

RETHINKING MEDIA LIABILITY

punitive damages can be awarded if the plaintiff can prove the media
intentionally or with conscious recklessness published falsehoods. Consequently, the media is very unlikely to decline the retraction, but can
decline knowing that New York Times actual malice is very difficult to
prove.
This procedure recognizes that juries and courts can be wrong.
Only a finding of New York Times actual malice allows a truly massive
'damage recovery and only a finding of falsity buffeted by a finding of
negligence brings a judicial determination. Only if a reasonable person
could not support the other factual position does the court make a determination on truth. There is, I believe, a real danger to putting too much
stock in a judicial determination of truth, especially when the court is not
required to find at least negligent culpability. It is one thing for a court
to have found no reasonable person could have thought the statement
accurate and quite another for the court to simply choose between two
competing versions of the truth.
While Professors Franklin and Barrett, as well as the Annenberg
proposal, are concerned with the jury wrongly finding negligence, I am
more concerned with the jury wrongly finding falsity, especially where
no culpability must also be proven. Perhaps the supporters of the declaratory judgment approach can feel comfortable because no damages are at
stake.' 19 Unfortunately, the judgment itself, which doesn't even require
a retraction under their models, is not worthy of being characterized a
remedy, much less one motivating litigation without a contingent fee.
Ultimately, torts such as defamation are significant because they provide
a remedy. As for what is really "true," nothing beats the marketplace of
ideas, not even the courts.
The existence of real remedies stimulates deterrence and provides
compensation. Admittedly, proposals with less remedies may more effectively discourage litigation. If defamation injury is taken seriously as
a real loss, the potential of tort remedies to both deter negligent journalism and provide real compensation when necessary is worth the cost.
Finally, it should be observed that society benefits from the injured
being compensated and wrongdoers being deterred. The wanton destruction of a family's livelihood through defamation is a real injury to the
plaintiff and to the community that relies on principles of fairness. Perceptions of justice and decency require compensation. 120 Protecting First
119 See also Leval, supra note 3, arguing that a "no-money, no-fault" judgment improves
the system by reducing costs and increasing efficiency, thereby providing advantages to both
plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs gain through a determination of falsity, and defendants
gain through an absence of liability for damages.
120 See Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 743 (1986).
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Amendment values need not preclude professional accountability. The
balance in media regulation needs some cautious adjustment to ensure
such accountability.

